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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, DIVISION OF
OCCUPATIONAL AND
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING,

CaseNo.20040808-CA

Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.
W. SCOTT JEPSON, R.N.
Respondent/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH

JURISDICTION
Scott Jepson (Jepson) appeals from a final order in a formal proceeding before the
Department of Commerce. The Department concluded that Jepson engaged in
unprofessional and unlawful conduct and issued him a private reprimand. The Utah
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a)
(West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/ STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Jepson has listed twenty-one (21) separate issues in his brief. The Division
believes his statement of the issues is repetitive and inaccurate. The Division proposes
the following statement of the issues in this matter.

1. Did Jepson properly object to the expert testimony of Elizabeth Baker, R.N.,
regarding the standard of care for home health care nurses in the handling of medications
prescribed for their patients, preserving the issue for appeal, and if so, did the
Administrative Law Judge properly receive that testimony in evidence?
Failure to preserve an issue for appeal is a matter decided in the first instance by
the appellate court. Thus, there is no standard of review. "[I]ssues not raised in
proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in
exceptional circumstances." Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n., 947 P.2d
671, 677 (Utah 1997); accord Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm 'n., 855 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah
CtApp. 1993).
The Administrative Law Judge is granted broad discretion in determining whether
expert testimony is admissible and appellate courts review such decisions for abuse of
discretion. See Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1999); Patey v.
Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v.
Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (limiting testimony of expert
witness); State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
2. Did the Administrative Law Judge properly exclude the exhibit entitled
"Security of Other Medications and Supplies"?
The Administrative Law Judge is granted broad discretion in his decision to admit
or exclude evidence and the reviewing court should not overturn his decision absent a
showing of abuse of discretion. See Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d
2

474, 477 (Utah 1999); Stevenettv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 997 P.2d 508, 511 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999); Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
3. Did the Department act reasonably in determining that the "prudent practitioner
rule" does not strictly apply in home health care settings and in rejecting Jepson's
argument that the rule required him to take the morphine sulphate home with him instead
of leaving it with the patient's family?
Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own rules, especially where the
Legislature has granted the agency discretion in that area, is subject to deference by a
reviewing court. State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). On matters
of mixed findings of fact and law the agency is empowered to administer, the agency's
decisions are reviewed for reasonableness. Associated Gen. Contrs. V. Bd. of Oil, Gas &
Mining, 38 P.3d 291 (Utah 2001).
4. Did Jepson preserve for appeal his assertion that the Administrative Law Judge
gave him assurances that no finding of theft or taking would be made by the Board?
Failure to preserve an issue for appeal is a matter decided in the first instance by
the appellate court. Thus, there is no standard of review. "[I]ssues not raised in
proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in
exceptional circumstances." Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n., 947 P.2d
671, 677 (Utah 1997); accord Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm 'n., 855 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah
Q . App. 1993).
5.

Did the Department act reasonably in issuing a private reprimand to Jepson
3

and requiring him to notify his employers of that reprimand until five years after the date
of its order?
An agency's decision on the sanction to impose against a licensee who it has found
to have engaged in unlawful conduct is a mixed question of law and fact. The appellate
court will not disturb the agency's decision unless its determination exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality. Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
STATUTES, RULES. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following statutes and rules,
whose texts are reproduced in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-l-401(2)(a) and (b) (West 2004)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-501 (2)(a) and (g) (West 2004)
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-31b-502(5) and (7) (West 2004)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16 (West 2004)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-1-1 (West 2004)
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1) (West 2004)
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 901(a) (West 2004)
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R156-37-502(4) (2002)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns whether a home health nurse who has filled a controlled
substance prescription for a patient under his care is required by the applicable standard
of care to leave it at home with the patient's family rather than retaining possession of the
controlled substance.
On July 5, 2002, the Commerce Department's Division of Occupational and
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Professional Licensing (DOPL) issued a petition seeking sanctions against Jepson,
alleging that he had engaged in unprofessional and unlawful acts in his handling of a
controlled substance prescribed for one of his patients. A hearing on the petition was
held on April 25, 2003 and May 30, 2003, before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) and the Board of Nursing (Board).
On June 13, 2003, the Board issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and
recommended order, finding that Jepson had engaged in unprofessional and unlawful
conduct and recommending the issuance of a public reprimand. On June 16, 2003,
DOPL's presiding officer in this matter issued an order adopting the Board's findings of
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order.
Jepson filed a timely request for agency review on July 15, 2003. On July 30,
2004, the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce ("Department") issued an
Order on Review upholding DOPL's findings of unprofessional and unlawful conduct,
but changing the sanction from a public reprimand to a private reprimand. Jepson filed
his Petition for Judicial Review on September 22, 2004.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jepson's statement of the facts is not accurate. The following statement of the
facts is more correct.
Jepson is, and at all times relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed to practice
as a registered nurse in the State of Utah. (R. 29). From June 2001 through September
2002, he was employed as a home health nurse for First Choice Home Health. On April
5

5, 2002, First Choice Home Health temporarily assigned him to provide home nursing
care to H. M., an elderly disabled adult. (R 29). H. M. resided with K. B. and G. B., who
are her daughter and son-in-law. (R 29).
On April 11, 2002, Jepson determined that H. M. was unable to swallow her
medications. (R. 29). He contacted Dr. Erik Hogenson, H. M.'s primary care physician,
to obtain alternate pain management medication. (R. 29). Based on Jepson's assessment
of H. M., Dr. Hogenson prescribed Duragesic patches, a Schedule II controlled substance
containing fentanyl, and injectable morphine sulphate, also a Schedule II controlled
substance. (R. 29).
G. B. and Jepson obtained the prescriptions from Dr. Hogenson's office and
proceeded to a pharmacy to obtain the medications. (R. 29). The pharmacist filled the
prescription for Duragesic patches, and G. B. later took that medication home. (R. 29-30).
The injectable morphine sulphate, however, was not available at the pharmacy at that
time. Jepson attempted to locate the morphine sulphate at other pharmacies, but was
unable to obtain it in the multi-unit dosage prescribed by Dr. Hogenson. (R. 30).
After G. B. had returned home, Jepson eventually found a pharmacy that could fill
the morphine sulphate prescription in a different dosage. He returned to Dr. Hogenson's
office and obtained a new prescription for H. M. from Dr. James Rose for the morphine
sulphate in that different dosage. (R. 30). Jepson had the new prescription filled at
approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 11, 2002, and then took the medicine with him to his
own home. (R. 30).
6

Jepson left his residence on the morning of April 12, 2002, leaving the morphine
sulphate for H. M. behind while he checked on patients. (R. 30). In the meantime, H.
M.'s condition had improved significantly and K. B. and G. B. thought that the morphine
sulphate was no longer needed. (R. 30). G. B. left a telephone message for Jepson, at
Jepson's residence, instructing him to not have the morphine sulphate prescription filled
if he had not yet obtained that medication for H. M. (R. 30). Jepson had not received that
telephone message by the time he arrived at the home of K. B. and G. B. approximately
fifteen (15) minutes later. (R. 30). Jepson did not have H. M.'s morphine sulphate with
him. (R 30). He informed K. B. and G. B. that he had obtained the morphine sulphate but
had left it at his home. G. B. paid Jepson for the morphine sulphate. (R. 30).
Jepson returned to H.M.'s home on April 13, 2002. (R. 30). K. B. asked if he had
brought the morphine sulphate with him. (R. 30). Jepson responded that he could not
provide the medication to them because that would be an illegal distribution of a
controlled substance. He said he had destroyed the medication. (R. 31). K. B. and G. B.
had expected him to leave the medication at their home so that it would be available if H.
M. later needed it and another home health nurse could administer it to her. (R. 31).
Subsequently, First Choice Home Health learned of Jepson's handling of the
morphine sulphate. (R. 31). After conducting its own investigation, First Choice Home
Health reported the incident to the Division. The Division subsequently issued a Petition
against Jepson alleging unprofessional and unlawful behavior. (R. 31). The Petition
contained four separate counts against Jepson.
7

Count I alleged that Jepson possessed controlled substances outside of his
responsibilities as a nurse. (R. 352).
Count II alleged that Jepson: (1) failed to administer medication to his patient as
prescribed by a physician; (2) maintained a patient's narcotics medication at his
residence; (3) disposed of a controlled substance without a proper witness as is standard
practice in nursing; and (4) failed to report his suspicion that the patient may be a victim
of abuse or potential abuse. (R. 352-353).
Count III alleged that Jepson failed to produce a medication he purchased for a
patient. (R. 353).
Count IV alleged that Jepson maintained a controlled substance at his home and
destroyed the medication without a witness. (R. 353).
A hearing was conducted on April 23 and May 30, 2003, before the Nursing
Board. The Board concluded that Counts II and IV should be dismissed and that Counts I
and III were established. Among other things, the Board found that "[Jepson] failed to
exercise good judgment when he elected to retain the morphine sulphate in his home
rather than deliver that medication to [K. B. and G. B.]. [He] simply failed to recognize
that H. M.'s medication should have been available at the [home of K. B. and G. B.] if H.
M.'s condition again deteriorated as to subsequently warrant the use of the Duragesic
patches and the morphine sulphate for breakthrough pain." (R. 192). In its findings of
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order, the Board recommended that Jepson
receive a public reprimand. (R. 193). The Board's findings of fact, conclusions of law
8

and recommended order were adopted by the Division's presiding officer in an order
signed June 16, 2003. (R.180).
On July 15, 2003, Jepson filed a request for Agency Review. On July 30, 2004, an
Order was issued by the Executive Director of the Department affirming DOPL's finding
that Jepson engaged in unprofessional and unlawful conduct, but modifying the public
reprimand to a private reprimand. (R. 32). The Department also ordered Jepson to notify
his current employer of the private reprimand and thereafter to so notify any future
employers for five years. (R. 50). The Department's order also specifically ordered
Jepson to "deliver controlled substances prescribed for his home health patients to the
patient's home and [to] maintain them there for administration to the patient as may be
warranted." (R. 50-51).
On August 23, 2004, Jepson filed a Request for Reconsideration with the
Department. (R. 22-27). This was denied by the Department on August 24, 2004. (R. 1821). Jepson then filed a Petition for Review with this Court on September 22, 2004.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Department of Commerce found that Jepson, a registered nurse providing
home health care, engaged in unlawful and unprofessional conduct when he took some
morphine sulphate that had been prescribed for one of his patients to his own home
instead of leaving it in the home of the patient.
Evidence of the standard of care for home health care nurses in the handling of
medications prescribed for their patients was provided by Elizabeth Baker, R.N., the

9

Division's expert witness. Jepson failed to object to her expert testimony on that subject,
and even if he had, the testimony was properly accepted by the Administrative Law
Judge.
At the hearing, Jepson offered a web page printout as evidence of the standard of
care. He failed to provide the necessary foundation for the exhibit. Furthermore, the
exhibit was irrelevant because it addressed the standard of care in institutional settings
rather than home health care settings. The Administrative Law Judge acted within his
proper discretion in excluding that exhibit.
Jepson claims that a DOPL rule required him to take the morphine sulphate home
with him instead of leaving it with the patient. That rule requires a nurse to maintain
controls over controlled substances which would be considered by a prudent practitioner
to be effective against diversion, theft, or shortage of controlled substances. See Utah
Admin. Code Rl 56-37-502(4). The Board of Nursing disagreed with Jepson's
interpretation of the rule. It found that under the circumstances of this case, the rule
called for him to leave the morphine sulphate with the patient's family instead of taking it
home with him. The Board's interpretation of the rule, which was affirmed by the
Department, was reasonable.
On agency review, the Department affirmed the order of the Division except with
regard to the sanction imposed on Jepson's license. It ordered a private reprimand, rather
than the public reprimand the Division had ordered. The Department also required
Jepson to inform his employers about his private reprimand, for a period of five years.
10

The requirement that he inform his employers was a reasonable exercise of the
Department's discretion.
ARGUMENT
I. JEPSON FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF
ELIZABETH BAKER, R.N., REGARDING THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR
HOME HEALTH CARE NURSES IN THEIR HANDLING OF MEDICATIONS
PRESCRIBED FOR THEIR PATIENTS, AND TO PRESERVE THAT ISSUE FOR
REVIEW. IN ANY EVENT, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROPERLY
RECEIVED THAT TESTIMONY IN EVIDENCE
Elizabeth Baker, R. N., ("Nurse Baker") was the expert witness called by DOPL to
establish the standard of care for home health care nurses in the handling of prescription
medications for their patients. On appeal, Jepson argues that he made timely objection to
her testimony and that the Administrative Law Judge improperly accepted her testimony
regarding the appropriate standard of care. (Aplt. Br. at 24). For the reasons set forth
below, however, Jepson's claims lack merit.
1. Jepson made no objection to Elizabeth Baker's testimony as an expert regarding the
standard of care for home health care nurses in their handling of medications prescribed
for their patients and he failed to preserve that issue for review.
It is fundamental that "[a] party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or
waive its right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoffv.
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Lopez v. Schwendiman,
720 P.2d 718, 781 (Utah 1986)). "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless . . . a timely objection or motion to strike appears of
record, stating the specific ground of objection... ." Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1); see State v.
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Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah) (requiring clear and definite objection at trial to
preserve purported evidentiary error for appeal), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
Although Jepson claims that he objected at least six times to Nurse Baker
testifying as an expert witness, this claim is not borne out by the record.1 A careful
review of what Jepson calls "Objections to Nurse Baker's Testimony"reveals that he did
not properly preserve any objection to her testimony as an expert.2
A. Jepson's First Alleged Objection
On direct examination, by Assistant Attorney General Lorrie Lima, Nurse Baker was
asked:
Q.
Once a controlled substance prescription is issued to a patient, does the
home health nurse determine if and when the medication can either be physically
delivered to the patient or the caregivers or be retained by the patient or the
caregivers?
(April Transcript pg. 98, In. 19-23). Jepson's attorney then objected that the question was
a legal one:
Mr. Arron Jepson: I am going to object. I think that's a legal question. Depends
on what the statute says and the rules say. It's not subject to an opinion on that
point.
(April Transcript pg. 98, In. 24-pg. 99, In 2)(emphasis added). Here, Jepson was clearly

*In Addendum - Exhibit 2 of his brief and in the portions of his brief that refer to that
exhibit, Jepson describes these six alleged objections to Nurse Baker's testimony. The
Department has moved to strike those parts of Jepson's brief, but it is addressing those issues
here in the event the Court does not grant the State's motion to strike.
2

For the convenience of this Court, the pages of the transcript which contain what Jepson
describes as his six objections to Nurse Baker's testimony are attached as Addendum B. They
consist of pages 98-100 and 136 of the April Transcript.
12

objecting that the question asked for a legal conclusion rather than opinion testimony. He
was not, however, objecting as to the witness's qualifications to testify as an expert, or to
her offering expert testimony. In response to this objection, the ALJ ruled that the
question was being put to the witness in the capacity of an expert and that she could
answer it in that context. (April Transcript pg. 99, In. 3-6).
B. Jepson's Second andThird Alleged Objections
Immediately after the exchange described above, Jepson's attorney said: "Then, I
object because she has not been qualified in that area." (April Transcript pg. 99, In. 7-8).
Although what Jepson's attorney meant by "that area" is unclear, this objection could be
construed as one to Ms. Baker's qualifications to testify on a particular subject. If that is
what Jepson had in mind, however, the Administrative Law Judge apparently did not
understand it that way, because the judge's response to this objection was to say "I think
she was being offered as one [expert witness], is she not, Miss Lima?" Ms. Lima replied
"She is." (April Transcript pg. 99, In. 9-11).
If Jepson had an objection to Nurse Baker offering testimony on any particular
subject, this was his chance to make a record of it. For example, if he had an objection
about whether sufficient foundation had been laid to establish her qualifications to testify
about what he describes in his brief as "the central issue of this case," namely "the
handling, control and administration of liquid morphine," then his counsel could have
preserved that issue for appeal by clearly explaining that objection to the Administrative
Law Judge. This did not happen. Instead, Jepson's counsel effectively dropped his
13

objection by saying "I beg your pardon, Judge. She was offered - - she was not offered,
but I guess she is now, as a qualified expert witness on home health care." (April
Transcript pg. 99, In. 12-14). Jepson said nothing to explain or preserve any objection on
the subject of Nurse Baker's qualifications, and he certainly said nothing about her
qualifications in the handling, control and administration of liquid morphine.
After Jepson's attorney acknowledged, as quoted above, that Nurse Baker was
being offered as a qualified expert witness on home health care, the ALJ said, "I think
that's what she is here to testify-." Jepson replied "Yeah. The question here is where
the legal duty lies as to who makes what determination and I think we can-." (April
Transcript pg. 99, In. 15-19). In his brief, Jepson characterizes his just-quoted statement
as being part of his "Third Objection." (Aplt. Br., Addendum Exhibit 2.) This was not an
objection, however, but a comment on the subject matter of the question that had been
asked of the witness.
What Jepson characterizes as his Second and Third Objections, then, were not
objections to Nurse Baker's qualifications to testify about the standard of care for the
handling of controlled substances, much less for the handling, control and administration
of liquid morphine. Jepson failed to preserve any record of such an objection.
The balance of the questions that Jepson claims are objections to Ms. Baker's
qualifications as an expert actually relate to other issues.
C. Jepson's Fourth Alleged Objection
Jepson's next alleged objection states:
14

Mr. Arron Jepson: Exactly. And the word authority means nurses are controlled
by statute and regulations and so the proper question should be, if it's asked, what
is the statute or where is the regulation and what does it say, not do you have an
opinion about what the law is, so I maintain my objection.
(April Transcript pg. 99, In. 25 - pg. 100, In. 5). This objection is not to the witness's
expertise, but is an objection that the question is asking for a legal conclusion.
D. Jepson's Fifth Alleged Objection
Jepson's next "objection" is really an objection that the rephrasing of a previous
question was inaccurate. Nurse Baker had asked for clarification of the question, and the
following exchange ensued:
Witness: If I understand the question correctly, are you asking me if a pharmacist
prescribes - - or if a physician prescribes a medication for a patient is there any
reason why I don't think that patient should have that medication?
Ms. Lima: Yes.
Mr. Arron Jepson: Objection. That is not what the question was. The question
was a determination of authority to act, not what her opinion is.
(April Transcript pg. 100, In. 9-17). This is not an objection to Nurse Baker's expertise,
but an objection that a question had not been accurately rephrased.
E. Jepson's Sixth Alleged Objection
Jepson's final "objection" came later in the hearing and was in response to a line
of questions to Nurse Baker about the potential lethal effects of Duragesic patches and
Lortab. Here, Jepson's attorney stated: "Objection. She has already clearly stated that
she doesn't have the background in administering narcotics to have any expert
testimony." (April Transcript pg. 136, In. 3-5). In this instance, the ALJ did not make a
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ruling on Mr. Jepson's objection, but rather allowed further foundational questions to be
asked of Nurse Baker regarding her experience with the questioned drugs. (April
Transcript pg. 136, In. 6-14). If Jepson had any objection at that point, it was his
responsibility to make that clear and to seek a ruling on his objection. He never did so.
Only one of Jepson's objections went to the issue of Nurse Baker's qualifications
to be an expert witness. That objection did not address the specific concern which Jepson
raises on appeal regarding Nurse Baker's qualifications, and he effectively dropped that
objection without following up on it. Not only did Jepson fail to properly preserve an
objection to Nurse Baker testifying as an expert on the standard of care for home health
nurse in their handling of medications prescribed for their patients, but Jepson's attorney
even asked asked Nurse Baker a question regarding that standard of care.2
Q.
Now, you have said that all medications, regardless of what they are,
prescribed for the patient in your opinion need to be left in the home. Is
that correct?
A.

If the medication is ordered for a patient, it should be in their home.

(April Transcript, pg. 117, In. 7 - 11).
Since Jepson did not preserve an objection to Nurse Baker's qualifications to
testify as an expert witness on the relevant standard of care, and since he himself elicited
expert opinion from her on that standard of care, his challenges on appeal to her
testimony ring hollow.

2

The ALJ allowed questions to be asked of the witnesses by both the Appellant, W. Scott
Jepson and his attorney.
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2. Even if Jepson had made a proper objection, the ALJ properly allowed Nurse Baker to
offer expert testimony regarding the standard of care for home health care nurses in the
handling of medications prescribed for their patients.
As a general matter, trial courts are to be given a wide measure of discretion in
determining whether a particular witness qualifies as an expert. Thurston v. Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah 2003 UT App 438, 83 P.3d 391(Utah Ct. App. 2003). In the
case at hand, the ALJ properly permitted Nurse Baker's expert testimony.
DOPL provided advance notice to Jepson of its intent to call Nurse Baker as an
expert witness at the April 25, 2003 hearing. The notice, entitled "Expert Witness
Disclosure," was sent to Jepson on March 11, 2003. The notice advised Jepson that the
expert would testify regarding her work experience as a home health care nurse and her
evaluation of the care provided by Jepson as alleged in the petition (R. 292-299). The
Division sent this notice pursuant to Department of Commerce Administrative Procedures
Act Rule R151-46b-9(3)(a).
When Nurse Baker testified proper foundation was laid for her testimony as an
expert. She testified regarding her education and background in nursing. She testified
regarding her extensive background in home health care nursing.3 The balance of her
foundational testimony described her review of records and documents relating to the care

3

Jepson asserts that because Nurse Baker was not established as an expert on liquid
morphine she was thus unqualified to offer expert testimony. (Aplt. Br. at 34). He is mistaken in
claiming that proof of such a narrow area of expertise was required. The relevant rules relate to
controlled substances, not just liquid morphine. The focus of the case was on the handling of
controlled substances in a home health care setting, and Nurse Baker was shown to possess
substantial experience as a nurse and in dealing with certain controlled substances. (April
Transcript pg. 90, In. 24 - pg. 93, In. 9; 136, In 6-9).
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of H. M. by Jepson. Nurse Baker's testimony described the general standard of care in
home health care nursing matters and multiple aspects of the particular standard of care
required in H. M.'s case. She testified that when medications are prescribed for the
patient, regardless of what they are, they need to be left in the patient's home. (April
Transcript, pg 117, In. 7-11).4
Jepson has not shown that the ALJ abused his discretion in allowing Nurse Baker's
expert testimony. Her testimony was properly received in evidence.
Note that Jepson's argument on appeal regarding Nurse Baker's testimony about
the standard of care for home health care nurses in the handling of medications prescribed
for their patients focuses on his assertions that he objected to her qualifications to offer
such testimony, and that her testimony should stricken from the record. (Aplt. Br. at 23).
Jepson does not offer any reasoning, however, as to why her testimony, assuming it was
properly accepted as evidence, does not constitute substantial evidence of the relevant
standard of care. The Department submits that Nurse Baker's testimony, such as her
statement that "[i]f the medication is ordered for a patient, it should be in their home" is
substantial evidence of that standard of care. Since it is undisputed that Jepson kept the
morphine sulphate himself instead of leaving it in the patient's home, Nurse Baker's
testimony provided substantial evidence to support the Department's finding that Jepson
4

Jepson asserts in his brief that Nurse Baker's testimony was "personal oppinion" rather
than expert testimony. (Aplt. Br. at 33). His assertion is not supported by the context of her
testimony. As shown above, she was clearly viewed by DOPL, the ALJ, and Jepson as an expert
witness and was treated as such by all of them.
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engaged in unlawful and unprofessional conduct. {See April Transcript pg. 117 lin 7-11;
pg. 240 In 4-14; (R. 41-42).
Not only are the Department's findings of unlawful and unprofessional conduct
supported by substantial evidence, but in any event, Jepson's failure to marshal the
evidence would justify this Court in affirming those findings as written. State ex rel L.
M, 37 P.3d 1188 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
II. JEPSON'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT "SECURITY OF OTHER MEDICATIONS
AND SUPPLIES" WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE BASED ON
A LACK OF FOUNDATION AND THE EXHIBIT'S APPLICABILITY TO ONLY
INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT
During Jepson's questioning at the hearing on May 30, 2003, his counsel sought to
have a web page printout entered into evidence which he claimed to be the standard of
care for the handling of controlled substances in home health care. The ALJ excluded the
printout as evidence. (May Transcript pg. 56, In. 18). Whether an exhibit should be
excluded on the basis that it lacks adequate foundation is primarily within the sound
discretion of the trial court. The ruling of the trial court will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 977 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999).
The ALJ's decision to exclude this exhibit was a sound exercise of his discretion.
First, no foundation was laid for the introduction of this exhibit. There was no
explanation of who created the document. There was no evidence of the purpose for
which it was created. There was no evidence given regarding the date the document was
created. Indeed, Jepson offered none of the foundation that is required to establish the
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authenticity of a document as a condition precedent to admissibility . See, Rule 901(a)
Utah Rules of Evidence (West 2004).
Second, the document was irrelevant. It was published on the "Home Care Page"
web page of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. The
content of the rejected exhibit, however, shows that it does not apply to home health care
settings. The proposed exhibit applies to only institutional settings. For example, the
exhibit refers to public access, patient waiting areas, patient examination rooms, and
private offices. Therefore, the decision of Judge Eklund to exclude the document as
establishing the standards applicable in a home health care setting was reasonable and not
an abuse of his discretion.
Even if it had been error to exclude the printout as evidence, Jepson has failed to
meet his burden of showing that the error was prejudicial. The Utah Administrative
Procedures Act provides that, in an appeal of an agency order, "[t]he appellate court shall
grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16
(West 2004). In Stevenett, 977 P.2d at 511, the court held that "the person asserting error
has the burden to show not only that the error occurred but also that it was substantial and
prejudicial." See also State v. Kiriluk, 975 P. 2d 469, 472-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). "In
other words, [appellate courts] must be able to determine that the alleged error was not
harmless." Aha Pac. Assocs. Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 931 P.2d 103, 116 (Utah
1997).
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In this case there was testimony from various witnesses, including that of Nurse
Baker, regarding the standard of care nurses should follow in handling prescription
medications they have obtained for home health care patients under their care. For
example, Nurse Baker testified that such medications should be left in the home with the
patient. (April Transcript, pg. 117, In. 7 - 11). As is explained above in this brief, there
was substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion, which was approved by the
presiding officer and affirmed by the Department, that the morphine sulphate should have
been available at the patient's home in case her condition were to later warrant
administration of that medication. (R. 192). The Board believed and accepted the
testimony of Nurse Baker regarding this standard of care. The Board was not required to
believe Jepson's evidence over that offered by the Division. Jepson has made no showing
that the admission of the disputed exhibit caused him to suffer substantial prejudice.
III. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED REASONABLY IN DETERMINING THAT
THE "PRUDENT PRACTITIONER RULE55 DOES NOT STRICTLY APPLY IN
HOME HEALTH CARE SETTINGS AND IN REJECTING JEPSON5S
ARGUMENT THAT THE RULE REQUIRED HIM TO TAKE THE MORPHINE
SULPHATE HOME WITH HIM INSTEAD OF LEAVING IT WITH THE
PATIENT'S FAMILY.
Jepson argues that when he took home with him the morphine sulphate that had
been prescribed for his patient H. M., he was actually doing so in an effort to comply with
Rule R156-37-502(4)("prudent practitioner rule"). He raises this argument in an effort to
defend against the Board's finding that he unlawfully took and possessed the morphine
sulphate when he took the controlled substance to his home and maintained possession of
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it, instead of delivering it to the home of his patient and leaving it with the family. His
argument is without merit and is no defense to the findings against him.5
Rule Rl56-37-502(4), the "prudent practitioner rule" requires nurses and other
health care professionals to maintain certain controls over controlled substances. It
establishes a "prudent practitioner" standard for determining what controls over
controlled substances would be appropriate under any given set of circumstances. The
rule reads as follows:
"Unprofessional conduct" includes:
(4) failing to maintain controls over controlled substances which would be
considered by a prudent practitioner to be effective against diversion, theft, or
shortage of controlled substances;
Utah Admin Code Rl 56-37-502(4). A nurse must thus consider whether a given situation
poses a risk of diversion, theft or shortage, and must maintain such controls over the
controlled substances as a prudent practitioner would consider necessary to effectively
protect against those risks.
The rule allows practitioners to address varying circumstances in different ways
depending on the risks involved. The Board's interpretation of the prudent practitioner
rule and its resulting conclusion that the Rule does not apply strictly in a home

furthermore, Jepson's argument that the "prudent practitioner rule" required him to
retain physical possession of the morphine sulphate is belied by his own actions in leaving the
Duragesic patches in the home of K. B. and G. B. (May Transcript, pg. 18, In. 2-6). The
Duragesic prescription was a Schedule II controlled substance, the same as the morphine
sulphate, and was subject to the same statutory controls for safety as the morphine sulphate.
Jepson, however chose to leave the Duragesic patches with the patient's family while retaining
possession of the morphine sulphate.
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health care setting, both of which were affirmed by the Department, are reasonable. The
environment in a patient's home is different from that in an institution. In an institutional
setting, patients, families and friends of patients, vendors, office staff, maintenance staff,
and the general public could potentially come into contact with an unsecured controlled
substance. Therefore, stricter controls in the form of security measures would be
appropriate in such a setting to keep controlled substances in a designated area where
only authorized personnel can access them. On the other hand, in a home health care
setting, the risk of public access is practically non-existent. The patient or her caregivers
control access to the home and to the medications in the home. Therefore, the Division's
conclusion that the "prudent practitioner rule" does not strictly apply to home health care
situations — in other words, its interpretation that strict controls over controlled
substances are not required in a home setting — is reasonable and well within its
discretion. The Board was acting within its reasonable discretion when it rejected
Jepson's argument that the "prudent practitioner rule" required him to take the morphine
sulphate home with him instead of leaving it with his patient and her family. There is no
evidence that leaving the medication in the home would have posed any risk of diversion,
theft or shortage. Such a conclusion is consistent with the plain meaning of the rule.
"When reviewing the [agency's] application of its own rules, this court will not disturb
the agency's interpretation or application of one of the agency's rules unless its
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Brown & Root
Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm % 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997).
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It is necessary to address one other point regarding the Board's statement that the
"prudent practitioner rule" does not strictly apply in a home health care setting. The
Board made that statement in the context of explaining why it felt there was insufficient
evidence to show a violation of Count Four of DOPL's petition. (R. 190-191). This count
was based on an allegation that Jepson had maintained a controlled substance in his home
and destroyed it without a witness, in violation of the "prudent practitioner rule." The
Board's discussion of its reasons for finding there was insufficient evidence to show a
violation of that rule included the statement that "Rl 56-37-502(4) does not strictly apply
in a home health care setting .. . ."(R. 191).
Jepson misapprehends the purpose and effect of this statement, which was simply a
part of the Board's explanation of its reasons for finding in his favor on Count Four. He
argues that, in making this statement, the Board (1) usurped legislative authority, (2)
purported to substantively change the rule, (3) suspended the rule from applying to home
health nurses, (4) failed to follow the procedural requirements of the Rulemaking Act, (5)
created three new crimes, and (6) retrospectively applied a change in the rule to Jepson, in
violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the U. S. Constitution. (Aplt. Br.
at 38-41).
As explained above, Rule Rl56-37-502(4) uses an objective "prudent practitioner"
test to define the controls a nurse must maintain over controlled substances in various
circumstances. Expert testimony at the hearing provided substantial evidence that the
standard of care in home health care settings is to leave medications, including controlled
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substances, in the home with the patient and the patient's family. The statement in the
Board's conclusions of law was nothing more or less than the Board's interpretation of
what the "prudent practitioner rule" would require in a home health care setting. As the
Utah Supreme Court recognized in Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 129 (Utah 1983), it
is not necessary that every aspect of professional performance be codified in detail and
members of the same profession in the process of administrative adjudication will
interpret standards of performance. Such interpretations by regulatory boards are
appropriate and Jepson's assertions that the Board's interpretation of the rule was
unlawful and unconstitutional are without merit. Besides, since the Board's statement
was made in the context of explaining why it was ruling in Jepson's favor on one of the
counts against him, it did not prejudice him in any event.
IV. JEPSON FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL HIS CLAIM THAT THE
ALJ ASSURED HIM THAT NO FINDING OF THEFT OR TAKING WOULD BE
MADE BY THE BOARD
Jepson claims that during an off-record discussion he was assured by the ALJ that
the Board would not make a finding of theft or taking. (Aplt. Br. at 46). Jepson failed to
include evidence of this supposed promise in the record and failed to preserve this issue
for appeal. As a result, it is not properly before this court.
V.
THE DEPARTMENT ACTED REASONABLY IN REQUIRING JEPSON
TO NOTIFY HIS EMPLOYERS OF HIS PRIVATE REPRIMAND.
When a licensee is found to have engaged in unlawful or unprofessional conduct,
the law allows DOPL to fashion an appropriate remedy to address the situation. DOPL:
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may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or private
reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license....
Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-401(2)(West 2004).
Jepson challenges the reasonableness of the Department's choice of sanctions
against him. He appears to be claiming that if the Department chooses to issue a private
reprimand, it cannot require disclosure of that reprimand to anyone. He fails, however, to
provide any reasoning or authority to support his argument, other than making assertions
to the effect that "[p]rivate means private" and that disclosure to another person means
that something is not private. (Aplt. Br. at 48).
Jepson's argument lacks merit. For the reasons set forth below, the issuance of a
private reprimand was reasonable and was an appropriate exercise of the statute's express
grant of discretion to the agency.
There are two important reasons why a regulatory agency might wish to issue a
private reprimand against a licensee. First, the agency has an interest in putting the
licensee on notice that he has engaged in inappropriate conduct, so as to discourage the
licensee from repeating the misconduct. A private reprimand has this effect.
Second, the agency has an interest in maintaining a record that the licensee has
engaged in inappropriate conduct warranting a private reprimand. If the licensee engages
in the same inappropriate conduct in the future, a more serious sanction might then be
justified. The record of the previous private reprimand would be an aggravating factor
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the agency could reasonably take into account in deciding what sanction to impose at that
time.
Both of these purposes for a private reprimand help protect the public. As the
Legislature has recognized, "the general public interest must be recognized and regarded
as the primary purpose of all regulation by state government/' and this responsibility for
protecting the public is set forth in the legislative findings and declarations in the Chapter
of the Utah Code which creates the Department of Commerce. Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-1
(West 2004).
It is entirely consistent with these purposes of a private reprimand to require the
licensee to notify his employers about the reprimand. The strong public policy interest in
protecting the public is furthered by enlisting the watchful eye of the licensee's employer.
The employer is in a position to implement appropriate safeguards to help avoid
repetitions of the inappropriate conduct.
In addition, making the employer aware of a licensee's disciplinary situation
enables the employer to provide training, support and encouragement to help the licensee
avoid future similar misconduct. This is a salutary effect which benefits the licensee by
helping him to stay in the profession and improve his work performance.
The Department's decision to issue a private reprimand , with a requirement of
employer notification, was a reasonable way of dealing with Jepson's unlawful and
unprofessional conduct. It meets two public policy goals-it protects the public, and gives
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Jepson a second chance. Jepson has failed to meet his burden of showing the sanction
was unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah asks that the order finding that the
Appellant has engaged in unprofessional and unlawful conduct and issuing a private
reprimand be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^

day of February, 2005.

MARK SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

>ERRY
BLAINE R. FERGUSON
Assistant Attorneys General
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58-1-401. Grounds for denial of license — Disciplinary
proceedings — Time limitations — Sanctions.
(1) The division shall refuse to issue a license to an applicant and
shall refuse to renew or shall revoke, suspend, restrict, place on
probation, or otherwise act upon the license of a licensee who does
not meet the qualifications for licensure under this title.
(2) The division may refuse to issue a license to an applicant and
may refuse to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on
probation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act
upon the license of any licensee in any of the following cases:
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct,
as defined by statute or rule under this title;
(b) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unlawful conduct as
defined by statute under this title;
(c) the applicant or licensee has been determined to be mentally
incompetent for any reason by a court of competent jurisdiction; or
(d) the applicant or licensee is unable to practice the occupation or
profession with reasonable skill and safety because of illness,
drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, narcotics, chemicals, or any
other type of material, or as a result of any other mental or physical
condition, when the licensee's condition demonstrates a threat or
potential threat to the public health, safety, or welfare.

58-1-501. Unlawful and unprofessional conduct.
(2) "Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, by a licensee or
applicant, that is defined as unprofessional conduct under this title
or under any rule adopted under this title and includes:
(a) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate, any
statute, rule, or order regulating an occupation or profession under
this title;
(b) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate, any
generally accepted professional or ethical standard applicable to an
occupation or profession regulated under this title;
(c) engaging in conduct that results in conviction, a plea of nolo
contendere, or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which is held in
abeyance pending the successful completion of probation with
respect to a crime of moral turpitude or any other crime that, when
considered with the functions and duties of the occupation or
profession for which the license was issued or is to be issued, bears
a reasonable relationship to the licensee's or applicant's ability to
safely or competently practice the occupation or profession;
(d) engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action,
including reprimand, censure, diversion, probation, suspension, or
revocation, by any other licensing or regulatory authority having
jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same occupation
or profession if the conduct would, in this state, constitute grounds
for denial of licensure or disciplinary proceedings under Section
58-1-401;
(e) engaging in conduct, including the use of intoxicants, drugs,
narcotics, or similar chemicals, to the extent that the conduct does,
or might reasonably be considered to, impair the ability of the
licensee or applicant to safely engage in the occupation or profession;
(f) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession
regulated under this title despite being physically or mentally unfit
to do so;
(g) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession
regulated under this title through gross incompetence, gross
negligence, or a pattern of incompetency or negligence;

58-31b-502. Unprofessional conduct.
"Unprofessional conduct" includes:
(1) failure to safeguard a patient's right to privacy as to the patient's
person, condition, diagnosis, personal effects, or any other matter
about which the licensee is privileged to know because of the
licensee's position or practice as a nurse;
(2) failure to provide nursing service in a manner that demonstrates
respect for the patient's human dignity and unique personal
character and needs without regard to the patient's race, religion,
ethnic background, socioeconomic status, age, sex, or the nature of
the patient's health problem;
(3) engaging in sexual relations with a patient during any:
(a) period when a generally recognized professional relationship
exists between the nurse and patient; or
(b) extended period when a patient has reasonable cause to believe
a professional relationship exists between the nurse and patient;
(4) (a) as a result of any circumstance under Subsection (3),
exploiting or using information about a patient or exploiting the
licensee's professional relationship between the licensee and the
patient; or
(b) exploiting the patient by use of the licensee's knowledge of the
patient obtained while acting as a nurse;
(5) unlawfully obtaining, possessing, or using any prescription drug
or illicit drug;
(6) unauthorized taking or personal use of nursing supplies from an
employer;
(7) unauthorized taking or personal use of a patient's personal property;

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for
review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form
required by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

13-1-1. Legislative findings and declarations.
The Legislature finds that many businesses and occupations in the
state have a pronounced physical and economic impact on the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state. The
Legislature further finds that while the overall impact is generally
beneficial to the public, the potential for harm and injury frequently
warrants intervention by state government.
The Legislature declares that it is appropriate and necessary for
state government to protect its citizens from harmful and injurious
acts by persons offering or providing essential or necessary goods
and services to the general public. The Legislature further declares
that business regulation should not be unfairly discriminatory.
However, the general public interest must be recognized and
regarded as the primary purpose of all regulation by state
government.

RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the
specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not
apparent from the context;

RULE 901. REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION
OR IDENTIFICATION
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.

Rl56-37-502, Unprofessional Conduct
"Unprofessional conduct" includes:
(1) a licensee with authority to prescribe or administer controlled
substances:
(a) prescribing or administering to himself any Schedule II or m
controlled substance which is not lawfully prescribed by another
licensed practitioner having authority to prescribe the drug;
(b) prescribing or administering a controlled substance for a
condition he is not licensed or competent to treat;
(2) violating any federal or state law relating to controlled
substances;
(3) failing to deliver to the division all controlled substance license
certificates issued by the division to the division upon an action
which revokes, suspends or limits the license;
(4) failing to maintain controls over controlled substances which
would be considered by a prudent practitioner to be effective
against diversion, theft, or shortage of controlled substances;
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that patient.

2

to be doing some teaching I would recommend that they

3

do what Karen does, which would be you write down

4

medications and when you give them.

5

that you would go over the side effects of these medications

6

with the caregiver.

7

go over them with her.

8

pain medication working, you know, any problems with it.

9

Q.

10
11
12
13
14

When it comes to pain medications, if I were

I think it's important

If the patient was able to understand,
It f s real important to know, is the

Thank you.
Who is responsible for maintaining security

and administration of controlled substances?
A.
is issued to.
Q.

I would say whoever the controlled substance
It ! s their medication.
So in the situation where a medication such
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as Duragesic patches is prescribed and the medication is

16

maintained at the home where the patient resides, who is

17

responsible for maintaining the security of that drug?

18

A.

The family.

19

Q.

Once a controlled substance prescription is

20

issued to a patient, does the home health nurse determine if
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and when the medication can either be physically delivered

22

to the patient or the caregivers or be retained by the

23

patient or the caregivers?

24
25

Mr. Arron Jepson:
think that's a legal question.

I am going to object.

I

Depends on what the statute
98

1

says and the rules say.

2

that point.

3

It f s not subject to an opinion on

Administrative Law Judge:

I think the

4

question was put to the witness in the capacity as an expert

5

and I think she can answer to the extent she understands the

6

question.

7
8

Mr. Jepson:

not been qualified in that area.

9
10

Then I object because she has

Administrative Law Judge:

I think she was

being offered as one, is she not, Miss Lima?

11

Ms. Lima:

She is.

12

Mr. Arron Jepson:

I beg your pardon, Judge.

13

She was offered -- she was not offered, but I guess she is

14

now, as a qualified expert witness on home health nurse.

15
16

Administrative Law Judge:

I think that's

what she is here to testify --

17

Mr. Jepson:

Yeah.

The question here is

18

where the legal duty lies as to who makes what determination

19

and I think we can --

20

Administrative Law Judge:

The question was

21

put in the context of a home health nurse and the question,

22

as I recall it, was does the home health care nurse have the

23

authority to decide when or how to administer controlled

24

substances.

25

Mr. Arron Jepson:

Exactly.

And the word
99

1

authority means nurses are controlled by statute and

2

regulations and so the proper question should be, if it's

3

asked, what is the statute or where is the regulation and

4

what does it say, not do you have an opinion about what the

5

law is, so I maintain my objection.
Administrative Law Judge:

6

I think the

7

witness can answer the question and the source and the basis

8

for her answer can then be explored and then I'll allow it.
The Witness:

9

If I understand the question

10

correctly, are you asking me if a pharmacist prescribes --

11

or if a physician prescribes a medication for a patient is

12

there any reason why I don't think that patient should have

13

that medication?

14

Ms. Lima: Yes.

15

Mr. Arron Jepson:

Objection.

That is not

16

what the question was. The question was a determination of

17

authority to act, not what her opinion is.
Ms. Lima:

18
19
20

Miss Baker, let me rephrase the

question --or let me modify it.
Q.

What is the standard of care when -- in a

21

situation where a patient is issued controlled substances by

22

his or her physician?

23

any say as to whether or not the family can retain the drug?

24
25

A.

Is the nurse -- does the nurse have

Well, the nurse -- the person probably

wouldn't be accepted for home health unless it was a safe
100

A.

1
2

You know, you probably could, depending on

your health status.
Mr. Scott Jepson:

3

Objection.

She has

4

already clearly stated that she doesn't have the background

5

in administering narcotics to have any expert testimony.

6
7

Have you used Fentanyl

A.

I have used the patch.

The morphine I used

was sub q morphine on a pump.
Q.

10
11

(By Ms. Luke)

patches?

8
9

Q.

So in and of themselves can either Lortab or

Fentanyl patches be fatal if you overdose them?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Can they in combination cause a fatality?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

If you worked for a facility that had no

16

separate wasting form or procedure in place, what would be

17

the nursing practice that you think meets minimum standard

18

of care in handling a wasting situation?
A.

19

Well, I would have a competent witness.
Mr. Arron Jepson:

20
21

have to object.

22

of care.

23

minimum and maximum?

24

assumes facts not in evidence.

25

Excuse me.

I f m sorry.

I

The question phrased says minimum standard

There is only one standard of care.

Is there a

And if there is, then the question

Administrative Law Judge:

Tell the witness
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